Two scenarios of Borjam and the prospects of the petrochemical industry

Perhaps few people imagined that the United States would fall under the results of the longest diplomatic negotiations in the world and that the forty-fifth president of this country would look at the camera on the evening of Tuesday, May 9, 2016 and make harsh words against Iran. The end of this speech was nothing […]

Perhaps few people imagined that the United States would fall under the results of the longest diplomatic negotiations in the world and that the forty-fifth president of this country would look at the camera on the evening of Tuesday, May 9, 2016 and make harsh words against Iran. The end of this speech was nothing but the signing of the annulment of Barjam; An agreement approved by the previous president of the same country. Undoubtedly, the most important levers of pressure of this economics graduate against Iran are the field of economics and especially vital industries such as oil and gas and petrochemicals and the monetary-banking system of Iran. Following the decision to abolish Burjam, Trump, 72, commissioned his diplomats to seek the support of the world, especially Europe, to achieve this goal. In short, although it is very quick and difficult to judge the winner of the complex game of Borjam, but for reasons such as the insistence of Europe and the international community to maintain Borjam, creating a rift between Europe and the United States, Iran can be partially won in the short term. Knew; However, in a market of diplomacy based on national interests, Europe will never be willing to pay the price for confronting the United States without taking new concessions from Iran. Many analyzes have been written and published on this subject. As mentioned, one of the most important and strategic industries that is under sanctions is Iran Petrochemical. What is the outlook for Iran’s petrochemical industry? To answer this question, two possible scenarios with Borjam must be considered; First, the preservation of the Barjam between Iran and European countries is subject to the submission of guarantees requested by Iran, and second, the cancellation of the Barjam. If we accept that the first scenario will happen, the petrochemical industry will continue on its current path, at least with fewer bumps, without the need for the United States. It must be admitted that even in this case, many large European companies, which see their interests more in connection with the United States, will already pack their bags and leave this country. This issue can have a relative impact on the amount of foreign investment, finance and the like. But if the balance between Iran and Europe is maintained, the target markets for petrochemical exports will still be immune from sanctions; Although these markets may change slightly. But the complete abolition of Borjam is another scenario that a powerful minority in Iran and the world believes in and has worked hard to achieve. In such a situation, Iran’s petrochemical industry has the experience of sanctions from 1389 onwards, and in macroscopic terms, it can continue its path with more experience and fewer errors. However, the question still remains unanswered: what prospects can be imagined for the petrochemical industry during the period of complete sanctions against Iran? The first embargo on the export of petrochemical products was related to the UN Security Council embargo, which was approved by Resolution 1929 on June 10, 2010, and then on November 20, 2011, the then President of the United States imposed tougher sanctions and imposed it. Ended. At this point, the Democratic president of the United States, who had portrayed himself as a moderate in public opinion, formally signed the law banning the supply of goods, services, technology, or supporting Iran, which expands the production of the petrochemical industry. Apparently, the story of the sanctions on the petrochemical industry did not end, which showed the importance of the issue as a strategic issue for the world with the aim of putting pressure on Iran. Subsequently, on April 25, 2012, the European Union tightened the ban on the sale of equipment and technology to Iran, and on August 29, the same year, a ban on financial and personal institutions related to the purchase of petrochemical products was added. At that time, the structure of Iran’s petrochemical sanctions consisted of five main parts and were: sanctions on the export of petrochemical products, financial and banking sanctions for export-related transactions, shipping sanctions and transportation insurance, technical knowledge sanctions and Catalysts, financing sanctions and financing and investment. It is clear that the passage of the above complex sanctions would not have been possible without the cooperation and coordination of the country’s major organs. Iran’s strategy at this time to reduce the effects of sanctions was to change the market from European countries, which began in 1391, and petrochemical shipments in the basket of Asian, African and South American countries. According to statistics released after the imposition of sanctions, 22 to 27 percent of Iran’s petrochemical products in terms of value to China, 13 percent to India, 18.5 percent to the Middle East, 18 percent to the Far East (except China), 23 percent to Southeast Asia, 4% exported to Africa and 2% to Europe. During this period, petrochemical companies faced two major problems; First, exports fell sharply, and second, due to financial and banking sanctions, they were unable to transfer their export currency inland and inevitably provided part of it to importers. Other side costs were unintended consequences of the sanctions. Perhaps the answer to the question of the prospects of the petrochemical industry can be sought to some extent in past experiences. If the sanctions are the same as in previous years, but the change of circumstances and the gaining of power by the competitors of the petrochemical industry will make the field more and more difficult for this industry. Competitors such as Saudi Sabik are willing to diminish Iran’s presence in export target markets, even under non-sanctioned and dumping conditions.